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Background
It may be recalled that Jackson LJ’s Review of Civil 
Litigation Costs: final report removed the success 
fee and after-the-event insurance from personal 
injury claims.* In its place, he recommended the 
introduction of qualified one-way costs shifting 
(QOCS).  This was implemented in Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR) 44.13–44.17, where a claimant would 
not have to pay the defence costs if they lost the 
claim, but the insurer would still have to pay the 
claimant’s cost if they lost. There are still some 
exceptions to the rule contained within CPR 44.16, 
which states: ‘Orders for costs made against the 
claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such 
orders with the permission of the court where the 
claim is found to be fundamentally dishonest.’
The introduction of fundamental dishonesty 
in primary legislation was through Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act (CJCA) 2015 s57; however, 
it fell to HHJ Maloney QC in  Gosling v Hailo and 
another (2014) 29 April, unreported, Cambridge 
County Court for the first explanation as to what 
amounted to fundamental dishonesty in both the 
CJCA and the CPR:
… It appears to me that this phrase in the rules 
has to be interpreted purposively and contextually 
in the light of the context. This is, of course, the 
determination of whether the claimant is ‘deserving’ 
as Jackson LJ put it, of the protection (from the costs 
liability that would otherwise fall on him) extended, 
for reasons of social policy, by the QOCS rules. It 
appears to me that when one looks at the matter 
in that way, one sees what the rules are doing is 
distinguishing between two levels of dishonesty: 
dishonesty in relation to the claim which is not 
fundamental and so as to expose such a claimant to 
cost liability, and dishonesty which is fundamental, so 
as to give rise to costs liability. 
… The corollary term to ‘fundamental would be 
a word with some such meaning as ‘incidental’ or 
‘collateral’. Thus a claimant should not be exposed 
to costs liability merely because he is shown to have 
been dishonest as to some collateral matter or 
perhaps as to some minor, self-containing head of 
damage. If, on the other hand, the dishonesty went 
to the root of the claim, then it appears to me that it 
would be a fundamentally dishonest claim: a claim 
which depended as to a substantial or important part 
of itself upon dishonesty (paras 44 and 45).
There can be a question about whether this 
approach was correct, but the waiting is now over. 
The judgment in Howlett and Howlett v (1) Davis 
and (2) Ageas Insurance Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1696 
has been handed down by the Court of Appeal 
concerning fundamental dishonesty.
The facts
Mrs Lorna Howlett and her son, Justin, made a 
claim for damage for personal injuries and financial 
loss based on an alleged car accident on 27 March 
2013. They claimed that they were passengers in 
a car driven by Penelope Davies (who was the first 
defendant), and that she negligently collided with 
a parked vehicle. 
The second defendant, Ageas Insurance Ltd, 
defended the claim on the basis that there was 
no accident and that even if an accident had 
occurred, it was at such a low velocity that any 
personal injury would be unforeseeable. However, 
what was more indicative of dishonesty was the 
fact that Ageas discovered that, on 7 December 
2012, both claimants were passengers in another 
It has been a while coming, but for personal injury solicitors and insurers alike there 
is now clarification about what amounts to fundamental dishonesty.
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Welcome 
guidance on the 
circumstances in 
which fundamental 
dishonesty may lead 
to a claimant losing 
the benefit of QOCS 
has been provided. 
Claimants who seek 
to hide behind points 
of pleading may well 
be disappointed. 
So long as all the 
cards are on the 
table, claimants 
should expect 
to pay the price 
for fundamental 
dishonesty.
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car negligently driven by Ms Davies, which had been involved 
in another accident in which Lorna Howlett and Justin Howlett 
were injured. This incident, however, was not disclosed to the 
medical expert; in addition, Ageas discovered that Ms Davies 
had been in at least four road traffic accidents between 2011 
and 2013.  
 There were also differing accounts in statements 
about how the accident occurred. Taking into account that 
there were no witnesses nor were the emergency services 
involved; that the claimants refused to undergo physiotherapy; 
and that they instructed solicitors in a different part of the 
country, led Ageas to one conclusion, ie, Lorna Howlett and 
Justin Howlett, and Penelope Davies dishonestly conspired to 
stage the accident deliberately. 
At first instance, Deputy District Judge Taylor heard the case 
and had no hesitation in dismissing the claim for fundamental 
dishonesty. The claimants appealed. The appeal was heard by 
HHJ Blair QC. He upheld Deputy District Judge Taylor’s decision, 
and Lorna Howlett and Justin Howlett appealed to the Court of 
Appeal. 
The lead judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by 
Newey LJ, with whom Beatson and Lewison LJJ agreed. While 
the court did not hear any arguments regarding the correctness 
of HHJ Moloney QC’s approach, neither counsel sought to 
challenge it and the appellants’ (the Howletts’) counsel spoke of 
it being ‘common sense’, with whom Newey LJ agreed (para 17).
However, this may not be particularly helpful as it still leaves 
open the question as to what amounts to dishonesty. The 
timing of this issue could not be better as the Supreme Court 
has just handed down the decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) 
Ltd (t/a Crockfords) [2017] UKSC 67, where general guidance can 
be found on the meaning of dishonesty.
No ambush on fundamental dishonesty
In any civil claim, the allegations must be proved; in this 
case, the burden of proof on the issue of whether a claim 
is fundamentally dishonest is set out in CPR 44.16. The key 
consideration in the wording of the Part is ‘where the claim 
is found on the balance of probabilities to be fundamentally 
dishonest’. 
The argument put forward by the claimant was that the 
trial judge should not have reached the conclusion that 
fundamental dishonesty had been found on a balance of 
probabilities, ie, more likely than not, because this had not been 
specifically pleaded in the defence. The question for the Court 
of Appeal was whether the second defendant, Ageas, had failed 
to meet an obligation to include an allegation of fraud in its 
defence. 
In its defence, Aegas said that it did ‘not accept the … 
accident occurred as alleged, or at all’ and was clear in putting 
Lorna Howlett and Justin Howlett to strict proof on all aspects 
of the claim (para 5). The defence stated: ‘If, which is denied, 
there was an accident as alleged, [Ageas] will aver that it was a 
low velocity impact unlikely to cause injury with injury being 
unforeseeable in any event’ (para 5). The defence went on: 
‘Should the court find any elements of fraud to this claim, the
second defendant will seek to reduce any damages payable 
to the claimants to nil, together with appropriate costs orders 
therein’ (para 7).
The Court of Appeal took a common-sense approach in 
considering whether any of the parties would have been 
surprised at a finding of fundamental dishonesty, based on the 
defence and the questions put at trial. A long list of facts and 
contentions made plain that credibility was expressly an issue. 
Lord Justice Newey, giving the leading judgment stated:
However, the mere fact that the opposing party has not alleged 
dishonesty in his pleadings will not necessarily bar a judge from 
finding a witness to have been lying: in fact, judges must regularly 
characterise witnesses as having been deliberately untruthful even 
where there has been no plea of fraud ... The key question in such 
a case would be whether the claimant had been given adequate 
warning of, and a proper opportunity to deal with, the possibility 
of such a conclusion and the matters leading the judge to it rather 
than whether the insurer had positively alleged fraud in its defence 
(para 31).
Taking account of the ample opportunity afforded to Lorna 
Howlett and Justin Howlett to respond to the requirement 
to ‘prove their case’, and the clear coverage of this in the first 
instance judgment, the appeal was dismissed (paras 5 and 7). 
Deputy District Judge Taylor was clear that there had been 
cross-examination: ‘so that the [Howletts] knew what they were 
facing’; that he had himself made it ‘perfectly plain from the get 
go’, such that the allegations of dishonesty and exaggeration 
were plain and Lorna Howlett and Justin Howlett could not 
claim any surprise (Court of Appeal transcript, para 38). 
What really matters is clarity and transparency rather than 
pedantic points of pleading. Lorna Howlett and Justin Howlett 
made a claim which was clearly and adequately challenged 
by the defendant insurer, Ageas. Whether or not fraud was 
specifically alleged was not crucial. 
The conclusion of Newey LJ’s lead judgment shows that a firm 
approach should be taken towards the question of fundamental 
dishonesty: ' the district judge was entitled to find that the claim 
was ‘fundamentally dishonest’ and, hence, that CPR 44.16(1) 
applied. The relevant points were ... sufficiently explored during 
the oral evidence' (para 40).
* Available at: http://tinyurl.com/go6s5co
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